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PROFESSOR FISCH: Good evening. I am Jill Fisch. As
Dean Feerick told you, I vill serve as Moderator for tonight's
panel.
We are grateful to have Albert DeStefano here, and I thank

him very much for his moving remarks. We are also grateful to the
members of his family who could attend and to the members of his
firm, and of course to the firm of Becker, Ross, Stone, DeStefano

& lein for its generosity in establishing this lecture series. Before

* The panel discussion herein was held at the Fordham University School
of Law on Ferbruary 12, 2001 to inaugurate the Albert A. Destefano Lecture in
CorporateSecurities & FinancialLaw. It has been edited to remove the minor
cadences of speech that appear awkward in vaiting, and to identify significant
sources when first referred to by the speakers.
**Professor, Fordham University School of Law.
***Senior Vice President, Thomson Financial/Carson Global Consulting.
**General Counsel, Securities & Exchange Commission.
***** Dwight Professor of Law, Columbia Univeristy School of Lavr, former
General Counsel, Securities and Exchange Commission.
****** Senior Vice President and General Counsel, Fidelity Management &
Research Co.
Senior Attorney, Delta Airlines, Inc.
Managing Director, Research Department, J.P. Morgan.
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we move on to the panel discussion, there are two people whose
names you have not heard who should be acknowledged tonight. I
think the empty chair next to me was intended to acknowledge the
contribution of Professor Steve Thel to this program. Even though
he is not up here on the panel, he probably should be. His role in
organizing it was as great as mine, and I'm very grateful to him for
all of his help, and I am sure the panelists are too. I would also like
to thank Helen Herman, who was the administrative coordinator
of this program, for all of the hours that she has put in and for the
fabulous support that she has given to the program and to the
lecture series.
In order to save time, I am not going to go through the
detailed distinguished biographical information on our panelists.
You have bios in your program. Let me just introduce the panel to
you.
Starting from the far side, we have Susan Ellen Wolf, who is a
Senior Attorney at Delta Airlines; next to her is Eric Roiter, who is
Senior VP and General Counsel at Fidelity Management &
Research Company; next to him, Professor Harvey Goldschmid,
Dwight Professor of Law at Columbia Law School; next to him,
David Becker, General Counsel of the SEC-who probably needs
no introduction; Richard Anderson, Senior Vice President at
Thomson Financial and finally, Alex Zisson, Managing Director,
Research Department at J.P. Morgan.
For tonight's program, we will begin with a general discussion,
which will include a brief overview of Regulation FD ("Reg. FD"
or "FD").' Then we will discuss the current developments and
recent experiences under the Regulation since the effective date.
Following that discussion, we will open it up to a brief question and
answer.
Let me begin with a very brief summary. I know you want to
hear from the panelists, who obviously have a lot more to say
about FD than I do, but just for those of you who are not familiar
with it, FD, or Regulation Fair Disclosure, was adopted by the
SEC on August 15, 2000, with an effective date of October 23,
2000. FD was designed to be an issuer disclosure rule, not an antifraud rule. In general, it prohibits issuers and those acting on the
1.

SEC Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R 243.100-103 (2001).
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behalf of issuers from selectively disclosing material non-public
information to securities industry professionals, to institutional
investors, and to certain other persons.
For our purposes, the salient aspects of FD are as follows:
o Who is covered y .D?

FD applies to issuers with securities registered under Section
12 of the Exchange Ace and those required to file reports under
Section 15(d)? FD covers communications by the issuer's senior
management, its investor relations professions, and people who
regularly communicate with market professionals and
shareholders. It does not cover every low-level or mid-level
employee.
o Which reclpient are covered?

In an effort to narrow its original proposal,4 which some
criticized as unduly broad, the SEC limited FD to issuer disclosures
made to four categories of persons: (1) brokers and dealers; (2)
investment advisors and certain institutional investment managers;
(3) investment companies and hedge funds; and (4) holders of the
issuer's securities in circumstances in which it is reasonably
foreseeable that the holder will purchase or sell the issuer's
securities on the basis of the information.
Included within these four categories are analysts, institutional
investors, and other market professionals. Not included are people
owing a duty of trust and confidence to the issuer, such as
professional advisors, lawyers, and so forth; persons subject to an
express confidentiality agreement-and I think some of our
panelists vill have something more to say on these confidentiality
agreements; and credit-rating agencies.
The SEC has stated that it believes FD should not cover those
involved in ordinary business communications with the issuer, such
as customers and suppliers, as well as the media.
o Wat is covered?

Covered is disclosure of material non-public information other
2.

Exchange Act §12,15 U.S.C. 781 (2000).

3. Exchange Act §15,15 U.S.C. 78o(d) (2000).
4. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Securities Act Release No.
33,7887, Exchange Act Release No. 34,42259, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590, (Dec. 20,
1999).
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than communications made in connection with a registered
offering. The SEC did not clarify the definition of "materiality,"
although it was urged to provide a more precise definition. In its
Issuing Release, however, the SEC listed several categories of
information for which close scrutiny is warranted, including
disclosures related to earnings, mergers and acquisitions, new
products or discoveries, changes in control or management,
changes in auditors, events relating to the company's securities,
and bankruptcies or receiverships.
The SEC singled out private one-on-one discussions between
companies and analysts regarding earnings estimates as an area
raising special concern, an area involving a "high degree of risk."
The SEC noted that even indirect guidance, such as expressing
comfort, can amount to selective disclosure.
* What is required with respect to disclosure?
There are two categories of disclosure. With respect to
intentional disclosures, which include both knowing disclosures
and reckless disclosures, the issuer must simultaneously disclose
the information to the public. With respect to unintentional
disclosures, the issuer must disclose promptly. "Promptly" is
defined by FD to mean within twenty-four hours or before the
beginning of the next trading day, whatever is later. This means an
issuer would have additional time if, for example, an unintentional
disclosure takes place over the weekend. Disclosure options
include: filing the information in Item 5 of Form 8-K,6 furnishing
the information in an Item 9 of Form 8-K 7 or otherwise
disseminating the information in a way that is "reasonably
designed to provide broad, non-exclusionary coverage.' 6' Methods
that satisfy this third option include press releases distributed
through widely circulated news or wire services, conferences with
public notice and access, and events in which the media is included.
5. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Securities Act Release No.
33,7881, Exchange Act Release No. 34,43154, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716 (Aug. 24,
2000) [hereinafter Final Release].
6. Exchange Act Form 8-K, Item 5, [1998-2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH), 131,002, (Oct. 6,2000)

7. See Exchange Act Form 8-K, Item 9 [1998-2000 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH), 31,002 (Oct. 6,2000).
8. 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(e).
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Publication on a Web site alone is insufficient.
o IFlalLy, what is the liability exponre under FD?
The SEC explicitly provided that failure to make a public
disclosure as required by FD is not a violation of Rule 10b-5;
therefore, FD should not expand the scope of antifraud liability.
Nonetheless, the SEC can bring administrative or civil actions, and
individual employees as well as analysts may be liable either for
causing violations or for aiding and abetting violations.
Now, for further background about FD, let me turn first to
Harvey Goldschmid, one of the principal forces behind FD. He
has spoken widely on this subject, and wil add a little flesh to the
bone.
MR. GOLDSCHMID: Thank you, Jill.
I was General Counsel at the SEC when FD was first
presented. I was a Special Senior Advisor to Chairman Levitt and,
along with David Becker, helped to finalize FD, so you may notice
a certain amount of bias in this presentation as I explain the policy
behind fair disclosure.
There are two basic images that you should keep in mind.
First is a conference room with one, two, or three analysts or a
telephone call. A CEO or CFO simply calls or walks into the room
and provides hard-core material information - "our earnings are
going to be dramatically dovm, our sales are dova, all of this is
going to begin next week or be announced next week." That is an
example of what Arthur Levitt correctly called "a stain on our
markets."9 The selected few can reap enormous benefits from
selective disclosure. In terms of public policy, there is nothing
good happening here.
The second image to keep in mind, though, is what made FD
and selective disclosure complicated, at least for me. That is the
image created by Justice Powell in the Dirks case" of the true
9. Former SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt, Jr., Quality Information: The
Lifeblood of Our Markets, Address Before the Economic Club of New York

(Oct. 18,1999), availableat
httpJ//vm.sec.govilnewsspeechlspeecharchive1999spch3O4.htm

(last modified

Oct. 18, 1999) (raising the issue of market integrity, and also suggesting that
selective disclosure "is a disservice to investors [and that it] undermines the

fundamental principle of fairness").
10. Dirks v.SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
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function of the analyst-to go out and question management, to
check strategy, to ask questions of customers and competitors, to
kick tires, to bring the kind of information back that the financial
sector needs. The trick was to find a way to end, if possible, the
unfairness of selective disclosure, but at the same time preserve
channels of communication, so as not to chill unduly
communications among analysts, investors, and public issuers.
Selective disclosure undermines investor confidence in the
fairness and integrity of our markets. Fundamentally, the same
policy rationale applies to insider trading. In addition, selective
disclosure has been used as a way of currying favor with analysts.
Instead of serious analysis, we had a dampening of enthusiasm for
criticism because analysts feared that critical reviews would result
in their being removed from those first in line to get material
information early. Selective disclosure diminished and distorted
the basic role of the analyst. Selective disclosure was very
unfortunate when it occurred, and it was occurring too often.
Moreover, if this information could be used as a commodity, then
there was reason to hold it back longer than anyone could want.
You could use it to keep more people in line. The whole practice
creates an unsavory atmosphere and a feeling of distaste in the
business community.
Now, thinking about what you can do about selective
disclosure, there were two basic possibilities. One was the kind of
rule making that we have gone through. The second was to take
that Dirks case, that classic case from 1983, and extend it out.
Dirks involved a fraudulent scheme through which Equity
Funding vastly overstated its assets. Equity Funding, an insurance
company, was on the New York Stock Exchange. An insider tried
to disclose the fraud. He went to Ray Dirks, an insurance analyst.
Dirks clearly tried to disclose the fraud. During the roughly threeweek period Dirks had the information, he went to The Wall Street
Journal and the SEC. There is no doubt about his attempt to
expose the fraud. However, during that period he also told his
favorite clients the news, and, of course, they found it a good time
to sell; they saved millions of dollars.
After three weeks, the fraud came out and the wrongdoers at
Equity Funding were ultimately put in prison. The SEC, in what
may not have been an ideal test case, decided to charge Dirks. The
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Commission was gentle with him-a censure was all he would
receive.
When the case reached the Supreme Court of the United
States, Justice Powell, in effect, said: "Look, before we find a
violation of Rule 10b-5 and insider trading, we want some kind of
breach of fiduciary duty. We want the tipper, the person giving the
information out, to have obtained some kind of"-and these are
key words-"personal benefit or personal gain."
The bar took comfort in the word "personal"-at least the
defense bar-arguing that this was not meant to cover entities at
all; therefore, selective disclosures by corporations were okay. If I
can put it bluntly, that was nonsense. Rule 10b-5" has always
covered corporations. God help the corporation that knows it is
going to make lots of money next month, and, without disclosure,
decides it is a good time to buy. The entity was going to be
covered.
The "gain" and "benefit" aspect was far more complicated in
terms of what the Supreme Court would do in a selective disclosure
case. Selective disclosure, as I have indicated, has been used to
curry favor, to buy goodwill or to avoid volatility. Could Rule
10b-5 be extended to a situation where a corporation was giving
out information for its own benefit? The Supreme Court defined
"benefit and gain" broadly. It talked about pecuniary gain; it
talked about reputational gain, a gift, and a quid pro quo on
information. But the question was: could you extend Dirks and
cover selective disclosure made for the corporation's benefit?
For me-and good minds can differ on this point-I thought
we could win the extension-of-Dirks case at the Supreme Court.
But I also thought there would or might be a heavy price to pay for
doing so. If we were able to extend Dirks, the fraud stigma, private
actions, and treble-damage disgorgement, would be available to
plaintiffs and could have had a large chilling effect on
communication. Large amounts of litigation could have been
stimulated and harsh exposures to liability created. The fair and
sensible thing to do, was a rule-making that could provide
relatively clear and prospective guidance and could be carefully
calibrated to preserve the flow of legitimate, non-material
11.

SEC Rule 10b-5,17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2001).
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information.
Now let me quickly go through the list of ways that we tried to
make sure FD would not chill communications.
First, as Professor Fisch indicated, selective disclosure was not
made fraudulent conduct. There would be no stigma of fraud
attached to selective disclosure.
Second, no private liability, no private right of action was
created. The SEC enforcement program would be there, but the
SEC had said time and again-and David Becker may speak to
this-that it would go after the extreme, the egregious case.
Third, there was room for an inadvertent disclosure. It was
perfectly possible, everyone understood, to get a question, answer,
and not realize something in the answer was material. The
possibility of inadvertent disclosure was built into FD. You would
simply have to go public within roughly twenty-four hours.
Fourth, provision was made for confidentiality agreements
that would allow you, for instance, if you blurted out something in
a one-on-one to an analyst, to say "will you keep it confidential?"
If he or she agreed, that would not be selective disclosure. Then, if
the analyst misused the material information, the insider trading
rules, which are much more onerous in terms of sanctions, would
come into play.
Fifth, corporations could narrow their exposure by defining
who could be talking to analysts and the investing public.
Sixth, public offerings were largely excluded. Public offerings
are covered under the '33 Act, 2 and I would advise everybody that
the technical aspects of FD in this area are tricky. Not all
disclosures made during a public offering-and not all public
offerings- are excluded.
Excluded, too, were foreign governments issuing debt and
foreign private issuers. The idea was that those with different
cultures, who reported under a 6-K, 3 which is different, should not
be included yet. However, with respect to both the '33 Act areas
and foreign private issuers, the SEC did make clear that it was
rethinking those areas in general. In the future, the FD approach
12.
13.

The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2000).

Exchange Act Form 6-K, 17 C.F.1, 249.306 (2001) reprintedin 4 Fed. Sec.

L. Rep. (CCH) j 30,971.
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could be extended into both areas.
The final area of protection was key for me. There has been a
lot of commentary discussing the materiality issue and how difficult
it can be to determine whether a matter is material. That is
absolutely true. The formulation of materiality is easysubstantial likelihood a reasonable investor would find it
important."4 The application can be very hard. I love teaching it.
Materiality is fun vAth students. Counseling is something else. It
can be a very difficult area.
Built into FD's system was a culpability standard-a scienter
standard-of intent or recklessness that takes all of the heat, or at
least much of it, out of concerns about materiality. This was
specifically put in to avoid the second-guessing of close materiality
calls in the harsh light of hindsight. It was not necessary under
Section 13."
Before you can be liable under FD, you either must have been
reckless, an extreme departure from standards of ordinary care,
when you err vAth respect to what is material, or you have to act
intentionally. The difficulty of materiality will remain, but the
safeguard is that the Commission would have to prove that there
was an extreme departure from standards of ordinary care in order
to hold an individual liable. There can be no easy blind-siding of
the corporate community.
With that, I guess it is time for me to cease.
PROFESSOR FISCH: As I listened to Harvey speak, I just
could not help agreeing vth everything he said. FD was extremely
controversial both through the comment process and at the time
that the SEC adopted it. Maybe we can hear a little bit from David
Becker about that controversy and how things have panned out
since the effective date.
MR. BECKER: Thank you very much. It is really a pleasure
to give you my views on how we are doing vth FD.
I must tell you that these are my views. These are not the
views of the Commission, any Commissioner, or anyone else on the
14. See TSC Industries. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 433, 445 (1975) (holding
that the question of materiality is an objective one, invohing the significance of
an omitted or misrepresented fact to a reasonable investor.)
15. Exchange Act § 13,15 U.S.C. § 78m (200D).
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staff. I hope I am not too far off, but this is not an official
statement of the Commission.
Another reason that I stress the word "views" is that right now
it is all anecdotal. There has not been a sufficient body of
experience to make any definitive conclusions, and I happen to
believe that we are in a period of adjustment with respect to this
Rule, as we are with respect to all new Commission actions.
There is also the impact of a very interesting dynamic that has
taken place over the last ten years owing to an increasing
competition in the market for legal services. Every significant
action of the Commission is accompanied by a series of letters from
law firms advising the clients of the development and what, if any,
traps there are to worry about.
It will not shock you-and it did not shock me, having written
quite a few of these in my time-that none of these letters ever say
"the SEC has come out with a major new regulation. Don't worry.
There are no damages here. You don't need me at all." In fact,
there is a natural tendency of lawyers to emphasize risks,
particularly those risks that they can help potential clients with.
Every public action of the Commission, certainly in the regulatory
area, generally gets met with a wave of-I would not even call it
criticism, but a wave of expressions of deeply felt, sincere, and
intense fear, and a warning of all the bad things that might happen.
I can tell you for sure, in terms of what has happened with FD,
the world has not yet ended. Someone is going to be right
someday on that prediction; but, until that person is right, everyone
else is going to be wrong, and the apocalyptic predictions for FD
have not come to pass.
What do we know? We know that corporate America is doing
its best to comply with FD. People wonder how FD is going to be
enforced. Of course, enforcement is necessary and the availability
of enforcement remedies may well affect people's willingness to
comply with alacrity. Nonetheless, the single most important force
for compliance with all our rules is the desire and the willingness of
those subject to our rules to comply and adhere-with the
enthusiastic assistance of the private bar-with the law. People
want to comply with the law, and our sense is that, while people
may have some questions as to what some of the nuances mean,
they are doing their best to comply.
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To me, the most interesting thing that has happened is that the
publication of FD has caused many people, particularly in the
analyst community, to rethink behavior that had been taken as a
given for years. There are two paragraphs in the Release that talk
about the risks that arise when there are one-on-one discussions
with analysts. Some people were surprised by these sentences.
While they are not that new, people just hadn't given the isssue
much thought since the Dirks decision.
Among other things, in some quarters, there had arisen a
practice of saying indirectly what one could not say directly.
Now, of course, if you are too obscure in this situation, you do
not accomplish your goal of conveying information. You do not
tell the analysts that something is going to happen. If you are clear
enough, by saying "yes, I am comfortable with that projection"and you do not have to say "get it?'-then what you have done is
by code transmit material non-public information. I do not think
people thought about that very much before these rules were
promulgated. What we are finding, particularly in the investment
relations community, is that people are thinking about that and are
rethinking their roles and how the corporate community should be
dealing with analysts.
I think life has gotten more arduous for analysts. There are
folks who did not attend meetings before who have to now. There
are folks who have to be not only conduits of the issuer, but who
instead have to be wise, be analytical. I confess this does not
trouble me very much. I think it is a good development. And I
think that the market will discriminate among those analysts that
are better at analysis than those who are not.
We-and I also think this is a positive development-are
going to see less clustering over a consensus number. I do not
understand, myself, given the vagaries of the stock market and life
in general, how there can be a consensus number that makes sense.
The one thing we know about conventional wisdom is that it is
generally wrong.
Finally, we are finding some conservatism. I think right now,
in part because of the comment process and the immediate
aftermath, people have been emphasizing the risks and the
dangers. I think initially we are finding that some folks are being
more conservative than they are going to be six months from now.
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When they find that the Enforcement Division has not done
dreadful things to people who do not clearly deserve it, and as they
get used to dealing with some of the complexities of FD, the
corporate community will worry less and disclose more.
Let me end up with a prediction. I think that the long-term
impact of FD, of technology, and of the ever-increasing pressure to
get more information out, is that we will find issuers disclosing
more information more regularly and at shorter intervals.
Thank you very much.
PROFESSOR FISCH: We are fortunate to have David
Becker and Harvey Goldschmid on our panel. We are also
fortunate to have a number of representatives of different
perspectives who can speak to the view from the trenches.
Institutional investors are the largest players in today's
securities markets, and Fidelity is one of the larger institutional
investors. So, Eric Roiter, maybe you can tell us a little bit about
how institutional investors have been affected thus far by FD.
MR. ROITER: Thank you, Jill.
Far be it from me to disagree in concept with my learned
colleagues from the SEC, both past and present, so even if I did not
believe in what I am about to tell you, I think I might just say it in
order to be somewhat provocative.
Speaking of selective
disclosure, there will be selective parts of what I am saying that I
actually do believe are true.
From the standpoint of an institutional investor, when
speaking about FD it is really necessary to speak about two
different versions of FD. By this, I do not refer to the proposed
Rule and the adopted Rule. Rather, I speak of FD, the conceptual
rule; and FD, the operative rule, or FD as observed in practice.
From the standpoint of the first version of FD, FD the
conceptual rule, it is difficult - actually it is impossible - to
oppose any of the objectives that underlie FD. More disclosure,
parity of access to information, fairness and greater confidence in
the integrity of the markets - no one can oppose these objectives.
FD the operative rule is a different matter, for in practice FD poses
problems and complications that, in turn, highlight some of the
tradeoffs that were not fully anticipated by the SEC or not squarely
addressed by the SEC in its consideration of FD.
To my mind, there are at least five areas where Reg. FD the
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operative rule falls short of Reg. FD the conceptual rule:
First, the conceptual rule contemplates the promotion of more
public disclosure and, at the same time, preservation of what is
called the "mosaic theory" for analysts. The mosaic theory, under
the conceptual version of Reg. FD, remains alive and well. The
SEC, in its Release adopting Reg. FD, said that "analysts can
provide a valuable service in sifting through and extracting
information that would not be significant to the ordinary investor
to reach materiality conclusions. We do not intend by FD to
discourage this sort of activity."'6
In practice however, issuers, guided by their conservative
outside counsel, do not see it quite this way. A segment of the
issuer community-by no means all-sees this rule as a tradeoff.
For various reasons, these issuers operate under a version of Reg.
FD that pushes them toward open Webcasts and open telephone
conference calls and away from one-on-one meetings with analysts.
Some issuers see the SEC's rule as a zero sum equation: the more
public access and public disclosure a company provides, the less
opportunity need be given to analysts for one-on-one meetings.
One might ask: Why should this not be seen as a good result?
If a company is holding open Webcasts and conference calls, why
can't research analysts simply pose their questions in that forum?
There are at least two answers to this, one fairly obvious, the other
a bit less so. The obvious answer is that every analyst who wants to
ask all of his or her questions will not have the chance to do so,
given time and other constraints. This is not so much different
from a presidential news conference, as we all know. The other
reason is that an analyst, even if given an opportunity to ask all of
his or her questions in a public forum, will not do so. At least
speaking from the buy side, at least a buy-side analyst vill not do
so. This reflects recognition that the questions posed by an
insightful, well-prepared, and skilled analyst have value, at times
greater value than any particular answer that a company's
executive may provide.
In an important sense, there exsts intellectual capital that one
might call analyst work product that is quite analogous to the
attorney work product. In each case, only the client of the research
16.

Fimal Release, supra note 5, at 51,722.
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analyst or the attorney, as the case may be, should have the benefit
of his agent's analysis and guidance. Whereas the rules of evidence
recognize and support the notion of attorney work product, Reg.
FD, the operative rule, does not do so for analyst work product.
Secondly, to complicate matters, Reg. FD, the conceptual rule,
recognizes a distinction that Reg. FD, the operative rule, does not.
The former, for purposes of the materiality standard, distinguishes
between an individual investor and an institutional investor or
professional analyst. This is a critical conceptual point under Reg.
FD, because what is material for an individual investor in making
an investment decision differs from what is material from the
standpoint of an institutional investor or professional analyst.
However, Reg. FD, the operative rule, blurs this distinction,
leading some issuers to say nothing to research analysts that they
have not already said in their press releases or public conference
calls.
In practice, the gap between materiality for an individual
investor and materiality for an institutional investor with the
advent of technological change is narrowing. This is particularly so
in light of information now available to all investors, both retail
and institutional, over the Internet and the immediacy of access to
that information.
As issuers-at least some issuers-view materiality for
individual investors and institutional investors as converging under
Reg. FD the operative rule, such issuers become increasingly
reluctant to make a distinction between the two types of investors
for materiality purposes.
A third difference between Reg. FD, the conceptual rule, and
Reg. FD, the operative rule, turns on the scope of the materiality
standard. In concept, Reg. FD draws a contrast between material
information, on one hand, and what I would call interstitial
information on the other. The latter type of information is seen as
rounding out the mosaic, filling in the bits and pieces, to present a
full picture for the analyst. But Reg. FD, the operative rule, at
least to some issuers, blurs this distinction and treats virtually any
relevant piece of information as material if it relates in any way to
the company's current fiscal quarter and likely performance for
that current quarter.
The SEC Release accompanying the adoption of Reg. FD has
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led, in part, to this result by enumerating seven very broad
categories of disclosure that most issuers, along with their counsel,
have come to view as presumptively material. Among this list of
seven categories of information is any information related,
however indirectly, to earnings, and any information relating to
"new products or developments regarding customers or
suppliers.""7 Pretty hard to rule out anything under that standard.
A fourth difference between Reg. FD in concept and Reg. FD
in practice relates to the culpability standard that Harvey
mentioned, which turns on knowledge or recklessness." This
standard, like the standard of materiality, is viewed by many
issuers to be amorphous and elusive-one which, in practice,
should not be relied on. As a result, some issuers simply assume
that every piece of information given in closed sessions with
analysts will be seen to be given with knowledge of its materiality.
This has led, at least among some issuers, to a demand that analysts
agree in advance to confidentiality undertakings not to use or pass
on any information for some period of time until issuers can in
hindsight judge for themselves whether information has been
knowingly or inadvertently disclosed that is material.
A fifth, and final, difference between Reg. FD in concept and
Reg. FD in practice relates to the distinction between a senior
officer and a mid-level officer. As Jill explained, Reg. FD covers
only those disclosures that emanate from senior officers or those
who have a particular role in investor or shareholder relations or
those who regularly engage in discussions with analysts."
The SEC, in theory, meant to carve out mid-level officers,
regional sales managers, and officers of that sort to be open to
analysts for one-on-one's without worry about the applicability of
Reg. FD. In practice, we have seen for many companies, that
distinction has also been ignored. Instead, companies typically
designate those officers, senior or institutional relations, who are
given the responsibility for speaking to analysts, and everyone else
in the company is subject to a gag rule.
17. See Final Release, supra note 5, at 51,721. (listing all categories of
presumptively material information.)
18. See supra p. 281.
19. See supra p. 275.
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In short, those are five of the complications that we see coming
out of FD, the Rule in practice, and it causes one to consider the
tradeoffs that underlie it. Although the objectives, as I said at the
outset, are all worthy of praise, in practice, Reg. FD does call for
some tradeoffs and some compromises.
PROFESSOR FISCH: Thank you, Eric.
Issuers obviously are taking a variety of approaches at this
point in designing their disclosure policies, doing different things.
Susan, it is impossible to speak for all of them-and I am sure that
Richard and Alex will give us more of the broad perspective-but
maybe you can give us a little bit of a sense from the issuer's
perspective of what the challenges are and how you are trying to
meet them.
MS. WOLF: Sure.
I am coming from the perspective of large public companies,
and most of the companies that I am familiar with essentially aim
for scrupulous compliance with the securities laws. I am privileged
to sit on the Securities Law Committee of the American Society of
Corporate Secretaries and, through that, I do have the views of
many of my in-house colleagues at other large public companies.
From our perspective, Reg. FD compliance has not been a
problem, either in terms of the difficulty of complying or the cost
or the administrative burden. I do understand from colleagues at
smaller companies, particularly those lacking a professional
investor relations staff, that they have much more difficulty in
complying and are really racking up those outside counsel bills.
As David Becker mentioned, one of our biggest challenges,
actually from the in-house viewpoint, was not FD itself, but the
scare memos that went out from a large group of the largest law
firms-and calming down our litigators and general counsel who
did not have corporate backgrounds and convincing them that this
was not a fundamental change in how we related to our investors."
The primary change that I have noticed is that, prior to the
SEC's Release that discussed implementing FD, giving guidance in
the middle of a quarter that nothing changed in our initial outlook
was not a material development. Now we are doing that by way of
a press release or 8-K as confirmation.
20.

See supra p. 282.
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We and many of my colleagues at other companies are also
(until we see how the SEC enforces FD) making public, by way of
an -r or a press release larger volumes of information that we do
not believe is material. We want to err on the side of safety. For
companies like Delta, having that kind of a press release or an 8-K
is not a big deal.
The variation in companies' responses, I think, is based quite a
bit on their cultures. If you have a transparent culture and if you
regularly compete for investors by providing information and
disclosure, then I think that you should err on the side of the
compliance mode. That is just make a lot more things public to the
extent you were not already doing so. For example, at Delta we
were Webcasting our earnings conference calls for a year before
FD was proposed, just because it was something that our investors
wanted, but we are now insisting that certain investor fairs and
conferences where we participate are Webcast.
We are continuing to do one-on-ones, unlike some of the
companies that Eric described, but we are very careful in looking
at what the agenda is and what is to be discussed and making sure
that if we need an extra filing or press release, we work it in.
I think that, slowly, there are some best practices developing at
public companies. I think one of the main differences from what I
call the Wall Street proposals to the actual best practices is that
there is not one "cookbook" compliance program that works for all
companies or all industries.
Certainly, if you have a management team that interacts
regularly with members of the investment community and your
large investors, you might have to do more updating. Intel, for
example, has an undertaking on its Web site now to continuously
update its earnings projections, and my counterpart at Intel has
explained that the reason for the continuous update is that since his
guys are going to be out there talking about it, this way they are
sure that everybody is having access to everything at the same
time.

Other companies are having very free-form compliance
programs, where they feel like their spokespeople and senior
management very well understand what is material and do not
discuss it and are not likely to have an inadvertent intentional
disclosure, or even an inadvertent unintentional disclosure where
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you have a short grace period to correct it. There the company
may choose only to do a compliance program and create some
minor modifications to its disclosure policy.
Among the other best practices, I think certainly Pfizer has
been a model. They were also doing this before FD was adopted.
They file Q&A's as a press release or part of an 8-K routinely
covering all the subjects that their spokespeople and senior
management expect to be asked about by investors. So again,
when they are talking with Eric Roiter's people at Fidelity, they
are probably not going to be demanding or asking for a
confidentiality agreement because they feel like they have already
covered it.
For other companies that have a culture of holding things close
to the vest, that do not compete for investors with a free flow of
information, they may be shutting down and they may be having
less disclosures. Particularly where the lawyers and the senior
management do not feel comfortable that those people who are
going to be getting the questions and making the phone calls have
a good sense of what is material and what is not, or what drives
earnings and what does not, there may be a reluctance to follow a
more free-form model.
I do think that forums such as this, where people can trade
information on what they think and what they are doing about FD,
are very important in terms of continuing to develop best practice.
I know that many of us in the in-house community are also very
appreciative to David Becker and his colleagues for coming out so
regularly and being willing to answer our questions. That has
made the initial experience much less of a problem.
PROFESSOR FISCH: We have heard a lot both about
predicted and actual effects of Reg. FD on the Street. We have
heard predictions that FD would cause information flow to analysts
to dry up, that analysts would be less inclined to cover certain
companies or certain types of companies if they could not be
assured of selective disclosure and preferred access, that FD would
increase price volatility, and that FD could significantly affect the
accuracy of analysts' reports. Interestingly, those rumors have
gone in both directions. Some people argue there is not going to
be as much information so the analysts' reports will not be as good,
and others argue analysts will no longer be concerned about
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currying favor with the issuer in order to get preferred access so
they are going to be more candid and their reports will be more
accurate.
We have two people to tall: about what is happening on the
Street, Richard Anderson and Alex Zisson, Richard from a more
general perspective and Alex from a more experiential perspective
of himself and his colleagues. I know that I can trust them not to
steal each other's thunder too much because I understand that they
both went to Brown, so they have some institutional loyalty here.
Richard, do you want to start off?
MR. ANDERSON: In the spirit of fair disclosure, I just
learned when I first met Alex, about an hour-and-a-half ago, that
his father and I went to the same high school in addition to Browm
together. So he is definitely on my team!
I would not describe our experience, at least the experience
that I am going to relate this evening, as more general. I would
actually describe it as hands-on experiential, because we represent
more than 700 publicly traded companies to the investment
community and we are constantly, and have been for close to ten
months, very much involved in the formulation of guidance and the
implementation of FD.
What I wanted to play off today is this: Thomson
Financial/Carson actually did two surveys, one before the
implementation of Reg. FD in October," and another in late
December/early January z , sort of an early return, to get an idea of
how Reg. FD was going dowm, and what were the initial reactions.
We sent out surveys to over 700 of our clients. We received eightyone responses from a diverse mix of small-, mid-, and large-cap
companies.
We can, at this point, assure you and Chicken Little that the
sky has not fallen. Reg. FD is going down, I think, more smoothly
than was originally anticipated.

21. Investor Relations Survey on Regulation FD Practices conducted by
Thomson Fimancial/Carson, dated October 6, 2000 (on file vith the Fordhiam
Journalof Corporate& FnancialLaw).

22.

Investor Relations Survey on Regulation FD Practices conducted by

Thomson FimanciallCarson, dated January 17, 2000 (on file with the Fordham
Journalof Corporate& FinancialLaw).
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In our October survey, I think there was an 86 or 87 percent
affirmative response that they felt that after the implementation of
Reg. FD that they were going to see extreme fluctuations of their
stock price in the market. That question was asked again in early
January, and that 86 percent went down to about 25 percent.
I think there have been some very positive, good trends that
have come out of FD. The problem, I think, emanated from some
of the rhetoric. If you examine Harvey's earlier comments, about
"the three or four analysts who were brought into the conference
room and were given a heads-up on the company's earnings"' -I
do not know what company that was, but I can assure you, as Susan
would, that you are talking about the rare exception. But the fact
that this perception exists at all is troubling. The whispers, the
nods, the winks, were the issue and something had to be done
about it.
When we first went out and queried investor relations officers
and CFOs, we asked them specifically "what major changes are
you going to make in your investor relations communications
policies with the investment community as a result of FD?" Back
in October, approximately 75 percent of them said "none" or "just
minimal changes," because they interpreted the question to be
"have you stopped beating your wife?" The implication was that
all along they were violating something, so, therefore, if they
admitted that they were going to change their procedures or
practices, this appeared to confirm that what they were doing all
along was wrong.
However, when we asked the same question again in late
December, two months after FD went into effect, 81% of the
respondents indicated that they had made procedural and policy
changes in their investor elations practices.
I think most people agree that it is going to take a few
quarters before we really understand the impact of Reg FD. We
have begun to see certain trends coming out of earnings calls in
December/January, and I think we are going to see more concrete
trends coming out in this quarter as to the adoption or change in
certain communication practices.
Let me talk about some of the positive trends our polls show.
23.

See supra p. 277.
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Our surveys show that most companies have willingly adopted
the push by the SEC to go out and broadcast earnings conference
calls to the investing public. Most people have done this. Most
companies have invited the investing public into their earnings
conference calls or provided simultaneous Webcasts.
Another concern was would the investment banking firms that
sponsor investment conferences for their clients open them up for
the general investing public. In fact, we had some survey
respondents say that they would not be attending investment
banking conferences unless they were simulcastfWebcast at the
same time. The fact is that now, most investment banking firms
have made webcasts a condition of attendance, as opposed to a
precondition requested by the issuers?
MR. ZISSON: We just had a big health care conference in San
Francisco, and we offered all the companies the option to either
telephone simulcast or Webcast, or both, their regular
presentations. Almost every company took us up on that, although
it was not mandatory. We also had Q&A breakout sessions
afterwards which we did not allow them to simulcast, but we said,
"Remember, keep Reg. FD in mind when you are talking to
clients."
MR.ANDERSON: Let me talk about where I think other
substantive changes have taken place.
If we go back, let's say, six months ago, and if I am on the
phone helping a client prepare for their third quarter earnings call,

which would take place sometime in October, I would get that call
maybe three or four days before they were due to have it. I would
then work on the earnings release, then we would prepare
management, the CEO and the CFO, as we had done in the prior
quarters, to basically review the earnings release on the call. Then
maybe we would add a little bit about operations that you would
not put in your earnings release for the participants on the call, but,
by and large, keep it down to a quick twelve minutes, and then
open up the floor for questions - because that was the whole
purpose of the call, was to open it up for questions from the buy
side and the sell side.
This planning process has changed, I believe, dramatically.
Now we get the call two weeks before: "Come on down; we're
going to spend two days preparing for the earnings call." In
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addition, the preparation for the earnings call is a lot different.
Number one, now you do not just read the press release. You go
in, and each person-normally, you usually have two people on the
call-three people is okay; four people, forget it; five people, no
one is going to listen. Now you are involving not just the CEO and
the CFO, but you are involving the head of sales, you are involving
operations and so on. It is obviously at the discretion of the
company, but the whole idea is to provide more insights, more
people, more information.
We are going through and preparing a much more structured
call and script. We are anticipating all the questions, as many
questions as we can, from both buy-side and sell-side analysts in
terms of what information can we provide that would give them
guidance in those areas that we know they are going to ask. So
that, by and large, these calls-at least the ones that we have been
involved in and the ones that we have been monitoring-are, really
doing what FD has asked us to do.
What has also changed is that now when you announce your
earnings, whether it is at the close, end of the market, and then you
have a conference call the following morning, normally you have
one-on-ones with the buy side and the sell side. I cannot tell you
exactly what is going on with those one-on-ones, but I do think that
a lot of them are "wait until we have a call tomorrow and we will
go into more detail." Moreover, the earnings release also includes
guidance. Most companies did not include references to earnings
guidance in their releases previously. It is not specific guidance
that will come in the call; it is more guidance in terms of either
meeting the analysts' numbers for the quarter or what they see for
the following year. However, the interpretation has been to put
that general guidance in the earnings calls so that you can speak
about what is out there and speak more specifically in your
earnings call. This is, again, a positive change that a lot of
companies have adopted.
So I think that there are some very positive trends that have
come out of FD so far. There are some negatives. There has been
a limit to the flow of information, especially to the sell side. It is
interesting to listen to Eric, because what our survey found was
that there was more squawking on the sell side than there was on
the buy side. For those who do not know it, it is the buy side that
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put their money up; it is the sell side that makes the
recommendations. Although for years it has been the sell side,
maybe, that has been getting the first call and the attention, it is
always the buy side that at the end of the day is there for you or
against you.
MR. ROITER: I would just add this Rule does not draw any
distinction between buy side and sell side. However, when you
look at the SEC reasons for adopting FD, those reasons typically
apply much more to the sell side than to the buy side because the
latter typically are the last ones who would want to urge public
investors to go out and buy stock of a particular company. We
would want to keep our insights on a particular company to
ourselves to use for the benefit of our funds' shareholders.
MR. ANDERSON: Which, I guess, explains why your
questions might be more value-laden than others'.
I will stop there.
MR. BECKER: Keeping it to yourself has a certain negative
when you are using it.
MR. ZISSON: Thanks. I have plenty more comments than
that.
It was very interesting for me to hear, as a sell- side analyst-I
have been a sell-side analyst for ten years-to hear Mr. Becker's
comments from the SEC. I think I disagree with almost everything
he said, and that is possibly even a tribute to the fact that, just a
few short months ago, I was a lazy sell-side analyst who did not
have to go to meetings and did not have to do any independent
work, and that has all changed.
The one thing I agreed strongly with him on is that it is really
too early to be reading the jury verdict on this. We are only
partially through the first earnings reporting season post-Reg. FD
implementation, and I think, if we come back next year, everyone
will have a much better idea of what has really transpired.
I can understand why the SEC's sensibilities were offended by
the perception that there was a lot of almost insider trading
occurring and people were profiting from it. I guess it is hard for
me, as an individual analyst, to really comment on how big of a
problem that was perceptually and whether it is worth it to change
the system to avoid that. It is possible that it is.
I think if the main goal of Reg. FD was to protect the
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individual investor, I think it is too early to figure out whether that
will be true or not, or whether Reg. FD will disadvantage the
individual investor. I do think we will have a better sense next
year.
I think that companies have had three main reactions to Reg.
FD. I think over half of the companies that I deal with, or that my
colleagues deal with, have said, as a couple of people have
mentioned, "Well, our policy has never been to disclose material
information selectively, so we don't really need to change our
policy. Maybe we need to fine-tune a little of the wording by
referring to being comfortable with consensus, being comfortable
with a specific number or a specific range, but, in general, I think
most of the companies, probably 50 or 60 percent, have not really
changed anything.
I think 20-30 percent of companies have said, "Well, we don't
really know what material information is, what materiality is." I
think the SEC did a very good job giving a very specific example
with earnings guidance and specific examples of what language was
acceptable or problematic. I think the mosaic metaphor was very
unfortunate. I think it is such a broad term-where any one piece
of the mosaic may be deemed material if it completes the mosaicI think that is one reason why all the scare letters by lawyers have
to be taken seriously by companies. I would say 20-30 percent of
companies have just said, "Well, we don't know what material is,
so we are not going to say anything at all. If we have a conference
call, it will be open to everyone, but we are not going to say
anything meaningful, and we are just going to have a no-talking-toanalysts policy throughout the quarter." I would say maybe 15-20
percent of companies have gone the other way and said, "Well, we
don't know what material is, so we are going to disclose everything
and every piece of the mosaic will be disclosed in our conference
calls," and they have given ultra-specific guidance about what their
projected "SG&A"' is, their "R&D"' , corporate goals as far as
individual acquisitions - total open book on everything.
If companies do not change anything, there is really no impact,
positive or negative, on the individual investor, so I think it is the
24.
25.

"Sales, General and Administrative."
"Research and Development."
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other two where you really need to look and see what the impact
is. I have two thoughts on the matter. First, is I do not really think
there was a huge problem to begin with that Reg. FD was fixing. I
think, in general, information flow is capitalized on so quickly by
Wall Street, that there was not a situation where institutional
investors or certain individual investors had extended periods of
time-days or weeks or hours-to trade, buy or sell stocks, based
on whispers or rumors. I think that as soon as anyone starts to talk
about or make public the information, it spreads like wildfire
through Wall Street. Whether a company puts out a press release
at 10:00 a.m., in the middle of the market, or some analyst in the
morning call says, "Well, I've learned the company is going to miss
the quarter, and you can take it from me because I just talked to
the company and they gave their blessing," I think the stock moves
so quickly that no one was really disadvantaged over a broad
scheme.
There may be one or two examples everyone can point to. I
have actually had one of those examples in ten years, where a
company literally got three analysts together and disclosed
something selectively and materially. But I think that was very,
very rare.
When we are talking about individual investors, I think the
only people who are really going to benefit from the design of Reg.
FD are day traders, because most average investors watch CNBC
during the day. I do not think they take an hour out from work to
dial in to conference calls that their companies are sponsoring or
investments that they own. I just think that is a real minority of
investors.
I think most individual investors either understand that they
do not need to be day trading or do not want to be day trading, and
that is why they give their money to Fidelity or companies like that;
or the way they invest is to buy stocks that they know, they come
home and read the paper, watch the news, think about whether
stocks have been going up or down, and generally make their
decisions over time-they do not constantly call up their brokers
and get the latest information.
So I think, even within the individual investors, we are really
talking about a small segment. Perhaps, you can argue that they
need protection too.
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I think the tradeoff is for that segment of companies that will
not disclose anything-and I actually thought it was interesting that
Mr. Becker noted that perhaps one of the tradeoffs will be
analysts' estimates are no longer around a tight consensus.' I think
if you admit that is a possibility, or even a likely outcome, that
must mean increased volatility, because I think the companies that
are most likely to clam up, as it were, are the smallest companies
that are going to have the fewest analysts covering them. There is
going to be the widest disparity for what analysts' estimates are,
not only for earnings, but for general expectations. I think when
companies like that report-and, chances are, they are not right on
the mean-they are going to have the most volatility intra-day, and
it is going to be the individual investors who are least able to deal
with that.
My general perception is that there is not a ton of benefit from
Reg. FD for the average individual investor. There might be some
for the day trader who really is watching his screen constantly. I
think there is some chance that some investors will be
disadvantaged by the increase in volatility. I guess, with that said, I
generally agree with the panel that there is not going to be a big
impact either way, and, in any event, it is too early to really tell
what the impact is.
I know Mr. Becker has been taking notes throughout my own
talk and I know I am the last speaker, soMR. BECKER: Notes, but not names.
MR. ZISSON: I would like to close with that and turn back to
Jill to moderate the Q&A.
PROFESSOR FISCH: You have been a very patient audience.
Even though I can think of a dozen questions that I would like to
continue to ask, at this point I think we should open it up to you
for questions. Before I do that, however, if there is anything that
any of the panelists have to add let me give you the opportunity to
do that.
MR. BECKER: There is a lot I could say. I think I would
rather hear the questions from the folks in the audience first
however.
MR. GOLDSCHMID: I want to make sure everybody who is
26.

See supra p. 283.
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counseling here understands the reason for that mosaic. The
language in the SEC release was helpful language. It said that if
you have gone around, kicked tires, and gotten information as
analysts, and the last piece, which would not be important to the
reasonable investor but is important to you, if you get that last
piece from the company, it is perfectly okay. It emphasizes the
proper function of the analyst, which is to go out, get information,
work it through, kick tires, and if you get information from the
company, that is okay, as long as it is just a piece and not
something that would be important to the reasonable investor.
In general, there is an enormously greater amount of better
information coming out to the public. I think it is time to get
questions.
PROFESSOR FISCH: Yes?
COMMENT: Trust me, the sell-side analysts put their money
up. We are market makers; we put our money up. We have to
create liquidity in the marketplace. We don't believe our sell-side
analysts do that. We have to do some. There are 200 intended
consequences.
I listened to what Eric Roiter was saying on the work product
of an analyst. There is pride. There is professionalism. He talked
a little bit about what they are doing. What we are hearing is that
there is a lot of global disequilibria, because foreign analysts are
getting information that domestic analysts cannot because they
have a different mode of seeking information and, under the guise
of translation from a foreign language, they can come up with
information that domestic analysts feel very disadvantaged about.
A balancing here is taking place between the efforts of getting
information out there. We are finding from our clients that in
many instances they are going into chat rooms, and the translation
of what a company says and what comes back to us is in a foreign
language. We are worried that this information is free-form
because there is a lot of resistance to explain things that investors
can understand, rather than creating communication and guidance
that perhaps an institutional or professional analyst can
understand.
In other words, plain English is not being
communicated.
Finally, there is Rule 10b5-1, which is an awkward rule. There
is a major problem because of how FD is written. The
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Commission, unlike Rule 10b-18. ' where it creates a safe harbor, in
Rule 10b5-1' created only an affirmative defense. You may think
you have a "safe harbor," but we reserve the right to come after
you under state securities laws.
So what is being held against the investing populace and
insiders is trying to reconcile-and that is the issue, reconciliation
between what is perceived to be a safe harbor and then an
affirmative defense, and the propriety of disclosure that can be
made so that wealthy insiders can sell where they think that they
have the protection of the Rules-they really do not have thatand the investing populace, who will now go to Fidelity, to us, to
other firms, and say, "Please translate this. What does it really
mean?" We are having a problem communicating what the
language really means.
MR. BECKER: Let me respond very quickly. We did make a
call to exempt foreign issuers, but that is not a call to exempt
foreign analysts. If issuers are conducting their disclosures under
two sets of rules, I think they may find that they are having a
conversation with our Enforcement Division.
In terms of investors not understanding what companies tell
them; one of the things that the analysts community told us in the
comment period-and I do not doubt the truth of it-is that a lot
of times things come out and investors either do not understand it
or misunderstand it, and as a result, it is very useful to have
information filtered through analysts before it becomes public.
We made the decision quite consciously that there is no other
alternative to trusting the investors. There is nothing in the law
that permits us to single out a group and say "you have the
opportunity to receive information and to realize trading profits on
that information-an opportunity that is not available to the
general public." Everyone is going to adjust to this, and when
investors find themselves getting it wrong, I think that will
reaffirm, rather than undercut, the value of analysts and analysis.
MS. WOLF: One thing that is very frustrating is that when you
see the discussion in the chat rooms, it is obvious that many people
do not bring the historical background and the understanding of
27.
28.
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the complexities of an industry to reading a news release or an S-K.
Also, because of the fear of entanglement and adoption, the
company also cannot say, "Gee, you know, this analyst really got it
right. Maybe you should look at what he did."
To try to frame every news release in the right context for the
unsophisticated reader would mean that they would be thousands
of pages long. It is an unsolved issue. I do not think it is
particularly new because of FD or 10b5-1. I think it is just perhaps
highlighted a little bit.
MR. BECKER: Yes. The markets have a wonderful ability to
adjust, and that will be the long-run focus of analysts. Analysts are
not there merely to get information anymore.
Modem
communications puts information in everyone's hands. That is the
wonder of the Internet. But analyzing the information, really using
it for constructive purposes, that is where the pay dirt is and that is
what one hopes analysts are going to really do.
PROFESSOR FISCH: Yes?
QUESTION: Are most issuers reluctant to have their Q&A
broadcast?
MR. ANDERSON: You mean on their conference calls?
QUESTIONER: Yes.
MR. ANDERSON: No. They are Webcast.
QUESTIONER: They want them to be known?
MR. ANDERSON: They are. When they Webcast the
conference call, the Q&A is part of it.
MR. BECKER: There has been a dramatic, increase in public
Webcasts, and for very good reasons. You cannot do anything
wrong in terms of FD if it is a public meeting. You can put out
material information or non-material information. It is all
perfectly safe.
QUESTION: Mr. Zisson, you said that you were Webcasting
your health care conference, but not the Q&A sessions.
MR. ZISSON: That wasn't the Q&A of an earnings
announcement or a company announcement. Our health care
conference is just an opportunity for companies to give general
updates. So during the general update session, which lasted for
thirty minutes, it was simulcast. During the Q&A breakout session
afterwards, there was no simulcast. That was for our clients to ask
general questions. At that point it was incumbent on the company
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not to disclose material information. If they did, they had to
update investors appropriately.
PROFESSOR FISCH: Other questions?
QUESTION: Was there any concrete data that showed a
rampant problem with selective disclosure?
MR. BECKER: Both with insider trading and selective
disclosure it is possible to get at what the impact of a public
disclosure is and, as result, what benefits go to people who trade on
material non-public information. What you cannot get is the
incidence of selective disclosure, how much of it is going on. I
think, from a public policy standpoint, that is the critical question,
and I think that people at the Commission had to rely on
perspective, experience, and judgment on that issue.
I agree with Alex that this does not happen particularly often,
but it happens often enough, and often enough- "enough" is, in
essence, a social judgment. What one perceives really is a function
of where one sits.
I was surprised, when I came to the Commission, at the
number of people who I would have thought were otherwise quite
sophisticated-and maybe they are-who hold really deeply
cynical views about how the market works. People participate in
the market and I think, by and large, they would not do it if they
thought it were rigged. Yet, there is a lot of cynicism out there.
Harvey talked about the number one purpose of FD was
enhancing investor confidence. 9 I think what we have heard from
investors and what we have seen so far suggests that there was a
need and that this is having an impact.
PROFESSOR FISCH: Any other questions?
QUESTION: It appears that fears about enforcement have led
a lot of the companies to more or less clam up. Do you feel that
will continue to happen or do you see it just over time going away?
MR. BECKER: Well, there will be a first company. I do not
know when. If I did know, I probably would not tell you. I think
that you will find that we are going to be sensible about this and
that the actions that we bring will be pretty clear.
I do not think, as a practical matter, that 20 percent of the
public companies in the United States are going to get away with
29.

See suprap. 278.

2001]

REGULATION FD

303

clamming up. I do not think you can do that in this market and
expect investors to invest in your company, rather than in another
company that does not clam up. I think that is an understandable,
short-term, conservative reaction that over time is not sustainable
and will not be sustained.
MR. ROITER: I would add that, to the extent that companies
themselves do not give out information directly, it simply places
greater importance on the indirect ways that analysts get insights
into companies and information. We have seen at Fidelity-and I
do not think it is unique to our institution-that there is a great
deal more leg work being done doing surveys, and I mean global
surveys. It is important to have geographic dispersal of your
research personnel, to talk to customers and suppliers and
distributors of companies, to get the information indirectly that
perhaps in the pre-Reg. FD days you could get directly from
companies.
I think not getting information from those companies that
clam up Uill not really lead to less interest in those companies. In
fact, I think it creates a greater comparative advantage for those
institutions that have deep resources and research to do that leg
work indirectly so that they can get to judgments about the
prospects of that company that the market generally cannot do.
MR. ANDERSON: I think that you have to be careful when
you characterize a company as clamming up. It could be a relative
term. It could be that a company might be characterized as
clamming up when they have changed their policy with respect to
giving guidance, where previously, before FD, they would give
guidance up to a certain point and now they only give guidance on
their earnings call at the beginning of the quarter and that is it.
We found in our survey that the most difficult areas were in
terms of providing guidance dealing with FD, as well as providing
input to analysts' models, as well as reviewing their reports. A
good number of companies now just review the models for factual
information and do not comment on projections.
As far as the guidance, there is a growing trend that companies
are now giving mid-quarter guidance just to update the market, so
it gives them a benchmark from which they then can go out and
initiate one-on-one conversations with the analysts under this
umbrella of fresh guidance. I think that we heard before that the
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big issue is one of timing, and this gives them more time.
I think, overall, we found that only eight percent of those
people we surveyed literally said that they stopped doing one-onones with analysts. It is really premature to make any judgments.
MR. ROITER: What percentage have you found that are
asking for confidentiality agreements?
MR. ANDERSON: None.
MR. ROITER: I can add to your survey. We are seeing that,
and we think it is an unfortunate result.
MS. WOLF: Are you seeing a trend in any particular
industries or companies with certain kinds of issuers that are asking
for this, or is it scattered?
MR. ANDERSON: I do not think you can break it down by
industry, or even break it down between those companies that have
favorable developments or unfavorable developments that have
not yet been disclosed. I think it really is the result of simply who
is providing the legal advice to the particular company.
PROFESSOR FISCH: I think we have kept our panelists long
enough. Let me end this by thanking the panelists for their very
insightful remarks.

Notes & Observations

Notes & Observations

